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SEEKING CONSISTENCY IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
SECURITIES ARBITRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE
LAW STANDARD
Michael P. O'Mullan
INTRODUCTION

Arbitration, and securities arbitration in particular, is commonly

considered a quick and informal alternative to the court system.1 A
series of Supreme Court decisions in the last ten years has made arbitration an easily accessible route for resolving securities disputes 2
While recent trends have led increasing numbers to seek this forum in
1. Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., Securities Arbitration: Procedures, Strategies, Cases 2-4
(2d ed. 1992); 1 Ian R. Macneil et aL, Federal Arbitration Uw: Agreements, Awards,
and Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act § 3 (1995) [hereinafter Macneil]. See
generally Gabriel M. Wilner, Domke on Commercial Arbitration (1991 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing commercial arbitration as an alternative method of dispute settlement).
While much of this Note applies to commercial arbitration in general, the issues addressed will be discussed in the context of securities arbitration due to the widespread
use of arbitration as an alternative to the courts. See infra note 2.
2. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484-86 (1989) (finding broadly worded predispute arbitration agreements enforceable
in nearly all cases, including those involving the Securities Act); Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (finding predispute arbitration
agreement enforceable in Securities Exchange Act cases). These cases overruled
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which had held predispute arbitration clauses in
customer margin agreements unenforceable in securities disputes. l at 432-35. McMahon and Rodriquez, however, gave free reign to the predispute arbitration clause,
allowing such clauses to require arbitration of nearly all disputes. See New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 Fordham L
Rev. 1495, 1517-18 (1995) [hereinafter N.Y.S.E. Symposium] (discussing widespread
use of arbitration in the securities industry); see eg., 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2600,
Rule 600(a) (1992) [hereinafter N.Y.S.E. Guide] (allowing arbitration for any "dispute, claim or controversy"); N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 3712, § 12(a) (1995) [hereinafter N.A.S.D. Manual] (providing similar language); infra note 15 (discussing
Uniform Code of Arbitration). Due to the widespread use of such clauses throughout
the securities industry, arbitration has become the rule rather than the exception. See
N.Y.S.E. Symposium, supra, at 1519. Such a situation runs the risk of contract of
adhesion type coercion. See 4 Macneil, supra note 1, § 40.7.2.5 & n.65 (discussing the
shortcomings of arbitration in terms of contract of adhesion type lack of consent due
to some parties' lack of sophistication); N.Y.S.E. Symposium, supra, at 1513 & n.29,
1517-20 (1995) (discussing the issue of contract of adhesion type lack of consent and
explaining the current position that even if consent is lacking, the choice of arbitration
is consistent with federal policy, and, therefore, not voidable). Some commentators
are of the belief that if the industry uses predispute agreements to strip investors of
their rights, the courts will revisit the issue. See Constantine N. Katsoris, Mastrobuono
Not the Last Word on Punitives, 13 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litig. 144, 145
(1995) (focusing on punitive damages). While other areas of commercial arbitration
are moving toward wide-spread use of arbitration clauses, the issue is most pronounced in the securities industry. Therefore, the possibility of coercion must be
given special consideration in the securities context.
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the hope of avoiding the crowded and costly judicial system,3 great
confusion exists even among practitioners about the role of judicial
review for legal error in arbitration awards. 4 This confusion has resulted in division among the federal courts of appeals over the proper
grounds for vacating an arbitration award when the award is inconsistent with established law.5
Arbitration is an attractive alternative to a court trial because it is
faster, less formal, and less expensive.6 When arbitrators get the law
3. Reports prepared by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration show
a pronounced rise in the number of securities arbitrations submitted over recent
years. N.Y.S.E. Symposium, supra note 2, at 1507-08 (citing Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, Report No. 8, at 29 (1994)). Between 1980 and 1986, the
number of total arbitrations submitted to all self-regulatory organizations ("SROs")
rose from 830 per year to 2837 per year. Id. at 1507. In 1987, the number doubled to
6097, in part due to the McMahon decision, making arbitration mandatory in many
securities disputes. It.
4. Compare R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding no review of arbitration awards outside the statutory provisions of the Arbitration Act) and Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman III, Selected Topics in
Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class
Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65
Tul. L. Rev. 1547, 1620 (1991) (finding it debatable whether the manifest disregard
standard applies in securities arbitration) with Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
847 F.2d 631, 633-34 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding no restriction to statutory basis for
review) and Bret F. Randall, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially
Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 759, 765
(recognizing manifest disregard standard as an independent standard of review).
5. See NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co., 43 F.3d 1076, 1079 (6th Cir.) (finding manifest disregard an appropriate basis for judicial review), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995);
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1994) (accepting manifest
disregard standard), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995); McIlroy v. Painewebber, Inc.,
989 F.2d 817, 820 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) (limiting judicial review of arbitration award to
Federal Arbitration Act); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683-84 (11th Cir.) (rejecting
manifest disregard of the law standard of review, but accepting arbitrary and capricious standard), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (appearing to accept manifest disregard of
the law standard); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060
(9th Cir. 1991) (accepting manifest disregard of the law and completely irrational
standards); Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(refraining from adopting the manifest disregard of the law standard); Chameleon
Dental Prods. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting manifest disregard of the law standard); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990)
(finding two categories of nonstatutory review); Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v.
Norad Reinsurance, 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) (accepting completely irrational
standard); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633-34 (10th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing nonstatutory review); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing manifest disregard of the law
standard).
6. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1953) (explaining FAA intended to
avoid complications of delay and expense of litigation); Folkways Music Publishers v.
Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining twin goals of arbitration are efficient settlement of disputes and avoidance of the delay and expense of litigation);
Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(finding that arbitration creates a balance between speed and efficiency, and rooting
out possible error), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990); see also Hoblin, supra note 1, at
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wrong, however, the losing party often turns back to the courts for
relief.7 This creates a fundamental conflict between the speed and efficiency of arbitration and the more deliberate precision of the court
system. The courts' attempts to balance these competing interests has
resulted in great confusion over the appropriate basis for judicial review of arbitration awards.8
Surprisingly, the statutory relationship between the federal courts
and private arbitration has remained virtually unchanged since originally defined in the 1920s.9 According to the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), 10 the basis for judicial review of arbitration decisions is extremely limited." Under the FAA, the only acceptable basis for va-2
cating an arbitration award arises from procedural unfairness.1
According to 9 U.S.C. § 10, these grounds are: (1) the procurement of
the award by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) evident partiality
or corruption; (3) refusal to hear proper evidence or to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause; or (4) conduct by the arbitrators in excess of their powers.1 3 Such limited grounds for review under the statute reflect an intent to safeguard the parties'
forum selection and
4
promote speed, cost savings, and finality.1
2-4 (listing advantages of arbitration); 1 Macneil, supra note 1, § 3 (explaining advantages of arbitration).
7. See 4 Macneil, supra note 1, § 40.1.1 (noting situations in which arbitration
awards may be vacated).
8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. Compare United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L No. 68-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat.
883 (1925) with 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
In 1990 the statute underwent renumbering, which resulted in no substantive
change. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act Pub. L No. 101-552, § 5, 104
Stat. 2736, 2745 (1990). All references will be cited to the new numbering.
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
11. Sections 10, 11, & 12 of the FAA provide the exclusive statutory basis for
judicial intervention in arbitration awards found in the FAA. This Note will focus on
§ 10, which provides the grounds for vacating an award. Sections 11 and 12 provide
for modification of the award. Id §§ 10-12.
12. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(1)-(4).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration(1)Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2)Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3)Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4)Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
14. For a discussion of the legislative intent behind the FAA, see infra notes 12431 and accompanying text.
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Despite this narrow grant of federal jurisdiction, the federal courts
of appeals are sharply divided over when review of an arbitration
award is appropriate-most notably in situations where the arbitrators 5 have ignored or neglected the established law governing a particular issue. Some circuits refuse to recognize any grounds for
vacating an arbitration award other than the four listed in § 10.16
Other, more aggressive circuits have carved out by their own creation
additional grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards not found in
§ 10.17 A third group of circuits find such judicially-created standards
consistent with § 10(a)(4)'s mandate against arbitrators exceeding
their powers. 18 Chief among these judicially-created standards is review for the arbitrators' "manifest disregard of the law."' 9 According
to this standard, the federal courts may vacate an arbitration award
when the arbitrators have clearly ignored an established principle of
controlling law. 0 Although the bounds of this standard have never
been fully defined,"' it appears that in order to qualify for vacatur
under the manifest disregard of the law standard, the arbitrators must
intentionally ignore what they know to be the obviously applicable
15. Typically, arbitration panels consist of three or more arbitrators. See N.Y.S.E.
Guide, supra note 2, 2607, Rule 607(a)(1) (calling for three or more arbitrators per
panel if more than $10,000 is in controversy); N.A.S.D. Manual, supra note 2, 1 3719,
§ 19(b) (calling for between three and five arbitrators if the amount in controversy is
greater than $30,000).
Note that efforts by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") to
propagate uniform rules for securities arbitration have been largely adopted by the
SROs. See Hoblin, supra note 1, at 1-3 to 1-4 (discussing SICA's Uniform Code of
Arbitration). Because slight variations exist, this Note will cite to the N. Y.S.E. Guide
and N.A.S.D. Manual
16. See infra part II.A.
17. See infra part II.B.
18. See infra part II.C.
19. Examples of such standards include the manifest disregard of the law standard. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34
(2d Cir. 1986) (defining the manifest disregard standard); infra part I (explaining
manifest disregard of the law). For examples of similar standards such as the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, see Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683-84 (11th Cir.)
(applying the arbitrary and capricious standard), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992);
infra note 77 (describing arbitrary and capricious); for the "completely irrational"
standard, see Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Norad Reinsurance, 868 F.2d 52,
56 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying completely irrational standard); infra notes 184-90 and
accompanying text (discussing the completely irrational standard); and for the "draws
its essence from the contract" standard, see Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847
F.2d 631, 634-35 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing "draws its essence from the contract"
standard); infra part II.B.2 (same). Although this Note focuses on the manifest disregard of the law standard, these others, referred to as related or similar standards, are
the product of similar considerations.
Additional grounds for vacating arbitration awards include the public policy and
illegality exceptions, which are beyond the scope of this Note.
20. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing manifest
disregard of the law standard and similar standards).
21. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
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and clearly governing law, and, moreover, they must do so expressly
on the record3l The result is an unworkable standard.
The manifest disregard of the law exception to the limited FAA
grounds for review finds its roots in the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilko v. Swan.13 There, the Court stated in dicta: "In unrestricted
submissions... the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregardare not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation." 24 While Wilko's principal
holding was later overtumed,25 the admonition found in dicta continues to be cited.2s
Broadly defined, arbitration is a completely private settlement in
which the court does no more than enter the result into the docket,
much like a consent decree. At the opposite extreme, arbitration can
be seen as a short-form litigation process that attempts to skip the
backlog of the trial court, but expects the same exhaustive review in
the event that the law is misconstrued. If the former is more accurate,
no amount of review is necessary other than that to which the parties
consent. If the latter is more accurate, full judicial review is appropriate. Each of these possibilities presents a very different picture of
how arbitration should function.
This Note examines the uneven and unpredictable application of
the manifest disregard of the law standard and attempts to discover its
practical meaning. The discussion focuses on securities arbitration, in
which the prevalence of judicial intervention and wide variety of applications of the manifest disregard of the law standard are greatest.
Further, it attempts to distinguish the various policy considerations
underlying judicial review of arbitration, analyze the mandates of the
FAA, and thus create a consistent picture of arbitration as a whole.
For example, if an arbitrator's decision can be reviewed for legal error, written opinions, clearly stating the arbitrator's findings, should
be required.27
Part I attempts to define the manifest disregard of the law standard,
focusing on various attempts to distinguish manifest disregard from
ordinary judicial error. Part II examines the adoption or rejection of
the manifest disregard of the law standard as a basis for review by the
federal courts of appeals, as well as the various rationales used to justify the standard in relation to the FAA. Part HI analyzes the policy
issues involved in recognizing a substantive standard of review and its
effect on arbitration by proposing two models to assist in conceptual22. See infra part L
23. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
24. 1d at 436-37 (emphasis added).
25. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(overruling Wilko).
26. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995) (citing Wilko).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
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izing arbitration as a system of dispute resolution. The first model,
based on the consent decree, analogizes arbitration to the private settlement of the parties' dispute, that the court must accept absent some
procedural unfairness.2 8 The second model, based on judicial litigation, analogizes arbitration to a private courtroom, complete with substantive appeals for legal error.29 Part IV argues that the consent
decree model most accurately reflects a consistent view of arbitration.
This Note concludes that because the manifest disregard of the law
standard, and all substantive judicial review beyond the grounds enumerated in § 10, are inconsistent with the arbitration process, the correct approach to arbitration is found in the consent decree model.
I.

DEFINING MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW

Perhaps the most puzzling questions for courts faced with apparent
legal error in arbitration awards is when, if ever, they may intervene
to vacate the award. In Wilko v. Swan,3" the Court apparently distinguished "interpretations of law" from "manifest disregard" of the

law, 31 leading some circuits to adopt the latter as an independent basis

of review. 32 Long before Wilko, however, the Supreme Court, in Burchell v. Marsh,33 distinguished mere errors of law from "gross mistake" in the arbitral context, describing the latter as error "made out
to the satisfaction of the arbitrator" resulting in a different award than
would have resulted through application of the correct rule of law.3 4
Needless to say, courts have had a difficult time recognizing this dis28. See infra part III.A.
29. See infra part III.B.
30. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
31. Id. at 436-37.
32. See infra II.B.1.
33. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
34. Id. at 349-50. The Court explained:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted
to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, it should
receive every encouragement from courts of equity. If the award is within
the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for
error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and
would make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. In order, says Lord Thurlow, (Knox v. Symmonds, 1 Ves., 369,) "to induce the
court to interfere, there must be something more than an error of judgment,
such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake, either apparent on the
face of the award, or to be made out by evidence; but in case of mistake, it
must be made out to the satisfaction of the arbitrator, and that if it had not
happened, he should have made a different award."
Courts should be careful to avoid a wrong use of the word "mistake," and,
by making it synonymous with mere error of judgment, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over awards.
Id. Thus gross mistake is more than mere error of judgment, but what more, exactly,
is unclear.
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tinction. Such continued uncertainty is captured in this typical statement of a modem court attempting to define the standard for manifest
disregard of the law: "Although the bounds of this ground have never
been defined, it clearly means more than error or misunderstanding
with respect to the law."35 What is required, other than mere error or
misunderstanding, has yet to be determined.
The problem, then, consists of distinguishing such disregard of the
law from ordinary legal error by the arbitrators, which most agree is
beyond the scope of judicial review. In general terms, one court has
explained this distinction by stating that the manifest disregard of the
law standard "embraces instances where it is clear from the record
that'36the arbitrator recognized the applicable law-and then ignored
it." This conception suggests three important considerations: first,
what type of legal error is sufficient; second, what degree of awareness
of this error must be demonstrated by the arbitrators; and, third, how
must this be demonstrated to the reviewing court. The first question
asks whether a given law is both sufficiently controlling and determinative of the ultimate issue. The second question asks what degree of
intent must the arbitrators possess. The third question asks whether
such disregard must be stated directly or may be inferred from the
circumstances of the award. Each of these prongs of manifest disregard is discussed below.
A. What Error?
The first prong distinguishing manifest disregard of the law from
ordinary judicial review is the degree of error. In Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,37 the Second Circuit shed
some light on this question by stating: "The error must have been
obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator." Moreover the
error must involve a "clearly governing legal principle."3 9
Thus, according to the Second Circuit, the error of law described by
the first question must be one that is both "clearly governing" and
"obvious" to a qualified arbitrator. While this determination must be
made by a reviewing judge, it must be made not according to what law
is "obvious" and "clearly governing" to a judge. Rather, it must be
"obvious" to the average qualified arbitrator. This limitation is concededly significant, especially considering that most recognized arbi35. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d

Cir. 1986).
36. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
37. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 933.

39. Id
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tration bodies do not require their arbitrators to be attorneys.40
According to this limitation it is far from clear, which, if any, legal
errors would be covered by the Bobker standard. The clearly governing legal principle in cases arising out of securities arbitrations,
however, must be in the realm of what is obvious to an arbitrator,
rather than a judge.4
The Bobker case, for example, involved a dispute over the ability of
Bobker, a customer, to sell short 2000 shares of Phillips Petroleum
stock, while simultaneously tendering all of his 4000 shares to a stock
repurchase offer.42 Bobker hoped to take full advantage of the
favorable repurchase offer, which was likely to be pro-rated based on
shares tendered due to an anticipated oversubscription of the repurchase offer. 43 He also hoped to take advantage of the inflated repurchase price by selling short 2000 of his shares and later repurchasing
on the market after the proration date to meet the short sale."4
Bobker brought suit after Merrill Lynch cancelled his short sale because the broker believed it constituted a manipulative practice
known as a "hedged tender. '45 According to Merrill Lynch, Bobker
failed to maintain a "net long" position as required by Rule 10b-4 of
the Securities Exchange Act.46 Bobker argued that the short sale did
not violate the "net long" requirement, which is not expressly defined
by 10b-4.47
The arbitrators heard arguments on this point and decided in favor
of Bobker." The district court vacated the award, holding the arbitra40. See Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751, n.12 (8th Cir.)
(finding "the results of arbitration by private and untrained 'judges' are distinctly remote from the... application of principled law found in the judicial process."), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); 4 Macneil, supra note 1, § 40.7.2.5 (stating that the absence of legal training of arbitrators is a central theme of arbitration's critics); Stephen A. Hochman, We Need A Lawyers Arbitration Forum For Commercial
Arbitration, C907 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 259, 262-65 (1994) [hereinafter Hochman] (explaining AAA's rules do not require arbitrators to be attorneys); see generally N.Y.S.E.
Symposium, supra note 2, at 1679-93 (discussing training and selection of arbitrators).
41. Securities arbitrators are drawn from two pools: The first, labeled "securities
industry" arbitrators, consist of current industry employees, retirees, and professionals, such as attorneys, who devoted at least 20% of their time to industry clients within
the last two years; the second, labeled "public" arbitrators, have no such industry ties.
N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 2, 2607, Rule 607(a)(2)-(3); N.A.S.D. Manual, supra
note 2, 3719, § 19(c)-(d). Ordinarily, panels must consist of a majority of public
arbitrators. N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 2, 2607, Rule 607 (a)(1); N.A.S.D. Manual,
supra note 2, 3719, § 19(b).
42. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1986).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 931-32. A "hedged tender," according to the SEC, occurs when a shareholder responding to a repurchase offer does not have a "net long" position both at
the time the security is tendered and on the date the offer expires. See id. at 932.
46. Id. "Net long" position is not defined by the Securities Exchange Act or by
Rule 10b-4.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 933.
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tors had manifestly disregarded the law by rejecting the SEC definition of "net long" position.4 9 The Second Circuit reversed, 50 rejecting
the argument that it should "set aside an arbitration panel's award
because of an arguabledifference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws urged upon it."51
The Second Circuit explained that the governing law must be "well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable"5 to satisfy the manifest disregard standard. Under this standard, the court explained that the "net
long" position in Rule 10b-4 is not defined by statute, but had been
interpreted by the SEC.53 Such interpretations, however, must be upheld only when they are consistent with the legislation's purpose and
history, and are founded upon a rational basis. - 4 Because Bobker was
able to put forth an acceptable argument against application of the
SEC interpretation, the SEC definition was not "clearly applicable."
The manifest disregard of the law standard masks many of the potential errors in customer complaint cases because the arbitrators are
often called upon to interpret some aspect of the securities laws. 55
Moreover, even if the SEC definition had been part of the statute, the
arbitrators still had to apply the law to their factual findings. Because
arbitrators generally
have no duty to make express findings of fact or
i56*
legal analysis, in many cases, courts are forced to conclude that the
facts were open to multiple interpretations, preventing a clear application of the law.57
A similar issue arises where arbitrators give lump sum awards for
disputes presenting multiple legal theories with no explanation of
their findings. In Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,58 for example, a customer brought claims for churning, unsuitability, and margin infractions under federal securities law and state
49. Id.

50. Id.at 937.
51. Id. at 934 (emphasis added).
52. Id.

53. Id. at 932.
54. Id. at 936 (citations omitted).
55. See e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238
(1987) (allowing arbitration claims under the Securities Exchange Act); Remmey v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1994) (raising churning and unsuitability
claims), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995); FSC Sec. v. Free!, 811 F. Supp. 439,445 (D.
Minn. 1993) (interpreting statute of limitations issue), aff'd, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir.
1994).
56. See N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 2, 2627, Rule 627(e) (listing required contents of the award); N.A.S.D. Manual, supra note 2, 3741, § 41(e) (providing same
list); see also Hoblin, supra note 1, 11-16 (explaining that arbitrators rarely explain
their awards).
57. See e.g., Remmey, 32 F.3d at 149-50 (finding that conflicting evidence justifies
the panel's interpretations); Freel, 811 F. Supp. at 445 (refusing to vacate where arbitrators' decision does not clearly delineate the law); see also Hoblin, supra note 1, at
2-5 (stating that arbitrators' disregard of the law may not be clearly apparent from the
record).
58. 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1990).
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breach of fiduciary duty theories.59 Without explanation, the arbitrators awarded the Raifords a lump sum of $10,000, an amount bearing
no obvious relation to any particular claim. 60 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the award was sufficient because "the facts and claims
in this case indicate that the arbitrators could have fashioned their
award based on any number of valid reasons.'
In that case, the appellant could not possibly establish legal error, because
no findings of
62
fact facilitated the application of the correct law.
Other errors, on the other hand, might more easily qualify if they
arise in a proper factual situation. One example of such gross error
arose in Ainsworth v. Skurnick,63 where an arbitration panel found a
broker to have negligently handled Ainsworth's account in violation
of Florida securities law, but found no damages.' 4 The district court
vacated the award, because the panel had ignored a related Florida
statute which gave mandatory damages for such violations.6" The
Eleventh Circuit, in an unusual step, certified the question of the Florida damages statute to the Florida Supreme Court, which, in turn,
confirmed its applicability. 66 The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed
the district court's vacatur of the award.67
With the exception of the need to certify the question to the Florida
high court,68 this example demonstrates a potentially gross error be59. Id. at 1411-12.
60. Id. at 1412.
61. Id. at 1413.
62. The court in Raiford did not apply the manifest disregard of the law standard
because the Eleventh Circuit has not accepted such a standard, but instead applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard. IL at 1413. The Raiford court did, however,
state that even if it did accept the manifest disregard of the law standard, it would
have been inapplicable here. Id. at 1412; see infra note 77 (discussing the arbitrary and
capricious standard); see also Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882
F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("We reject the idea that a lump-sum award can be
rejected for want of explanation. . .

."), cert.

denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990).

63. 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1269 (1993).
64. Id. at 939-40.
65. Id. at 940. In fact, the district court sent the award back to the arbitrators in
light of the damages statute, but the panel again returned an award without damages.
Id.
66. Id.
67. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit corrected the district court's
application of the manifest disregard of the law standard, by applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard. Id, at 940-41. In this situation, the court treated the distinction as irrelevant. But see infra note 77 (distinguishing arbitrary and capricious
standard).
68. While the fact that the question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court
makes certain the statute's applicability, the fact that it needed certification demonstrates that the court of appeals was uncertain of its application. In that case, it would
be reasonable for the arbitration panel to have some doubt, justifying its initial award
of no damages because the law was not clearly applicable. See supra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text. Thus, under the Bobker analysis, the arbitration panel's first
award would not have manifestly disregarded the established law. The same is not
true, however, after remand from the Florida Supreme Court.
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cause a finding of liability under one statute, which the panel clearly
found, must necessarily lead to the imposition of mandatory damages
under a related statute, which the panel refused to apply. What makes
this error "gross" is the absence of any need for interpretation; that is,
a finding of liability triggers mandatory damages. Still, in order for
the court to establish the gross error, the panel had to make appropriate and clear findings.6 9 Such a conception of the error prong seems

most consistent with Burchell v. Marsh's definition of a "gross mistake" as one which is more than mere error or misunderstanding of
the law.70
B. DeliberateError
The second prong distinguishing manifest disregard of the law from
ordinary legal error is the degree of the arbitrators' intent to disregard
the applicable law. This distinction suggests that the degree of error
must not only be pronounced, but also that the correct law be consciously disregarded. In Bobker, the court stated: "Moreover, the
term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence
of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no
'71 This suggests intentional conduct. 72 The court
attention to it."
made its meaning more clear at a later point, explaining that to manifestly disregard the law, the arbitrators must have "understood the
terms and applicability of [the laws] ... and deliberately ignored them
in making their award." 73

Such a definition seems to exclude the situation in which the arbitrator should have known a given law was applicable, satisfying the
first prong, but lacking such knowledge cannot intentionally ignore
that law. Thus, it is not enough under the manifest disregard of the
law standard for the arbitrators to be negligently4 grossly wrong, but
rather they must be intentionally grossly wrong.
The Ninth Circuit has explained this distinction by stating that it
must refuse to vacate an award despite legal error, "if the award contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
69. That is, the panel had to find on the record, that liability was based on the
Florida securities law, which triggered the application of the damages provision.
70. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (distinguishing "gross mistake");
accord Mcllroy v. Painewebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no
evidence of gross mistake based solely upon the discrepancy between award and claim
when the arbitration panel exercised discretion).
71. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
72. In Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 749 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S 1141 (1986), the court used the term "expressly flouted the law,"
conveying the same intent.
73. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 934.
74. Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A]ppellant
is required to show that the arbitrators were aware of the law, understood it correctly,
found it applicable to the case before them, and yet chose to ignore it in propounding
their decision."), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).
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of the parties. '7 5 Thus, if the arbitrators' award unquestionably contains what would ordinarily be reversible error, but the error resulted
from the arbitrators' "honest mistake," the court may not vacate the
award. Therefore, in Ainsworth,76 if the arbitrators genuinely misread

the mandatory damages provision, the error would not be in manifest
disregard of the law.77

Such an interpretation removes arbitral review from the ranks of
mere review of the merits and places it into the purview of procedural
fairness. The court must not only be convinced of the critical legal
error, but also that the arbitrators deliberately ignored the applicable
law. The reversible award thus results from the arbitrators' subjectively-reached decision.78
C.

Demonstratingthe Error

The third prong distinguishing manifest disregard of the law from
ordinary judicial review is how clearly the decision to ignore the controlling law must appear on the record. 79 Some appellate courts appear willing to infer this disregard of the law, while others require a
clear showing of the previous two prongs on the face of the record!s0
If this prong is strictly enforced, the manifest disregard of the law
standard requires the arbitrators to expressly admit that they are ignoring what they know to be the correct law. Such a case is unlikely.
75. Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854)).
76. Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1269 (1993).
77. In Ainsworth, the Eleventh Circuit corrected the district court, finding the
award arbitrary and capricious, rather than in manifest disregard of the law. This
appears to be the difference between the Eleventh Circuit's arbitrary and capricious
standard and the manifest disregard of the law standard. The arbitrary and capricious
standard applies only if the basis for the arbitrators' award cannot be inferred from
the facts of the case. Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d
1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990). Under this standard, the arbitrators' decision does not
have to be willful, only wrong. Thus in Ainsworth, the district court's remand was
unnecessary to vacate the award as arbitrary and capricious, but might have been
required for vacatur under the manifest disregard of the law. The former requires no
subjective intent.
78. One court has stated, "manifest infidelity to what the arbitrators know to be
the law, but deliberately disregard might well be regarded as the use of 'undue means'
within the meaning of subdivision (a)[(1)] of 9 U.S.C. § 10, or amount to 'partiality'
within the meaning of subdivision [(a)(2)] thereof." San Martine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961). Thus, such a
situation may be deemed procedurally unfair, making an independent basis for review
unnecessary.
79. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683 (11th Cir.) ("There is inconsistency among
courts throughout the United States on the degree of the 'showing in the record'
required to satisfy the manifest disregard of the law standard."), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 201 (1992).
80. Michigan Mut. Ins. v. Unigard Sec. Ins., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) ("It
must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized the applicable law and
then ignored it.").
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Therefore, some circuits have adopted a slightly less strict
requirement.
1. Requiring an Express Showing on the Record
M is an exO.R. Securities, Inc. v. ProfessionalPlanningAssociates,"
ample of the most extreme requirement of a clear showing of manifest
disregard of the law on the record. There, O.R. Securities contested
its inclusion in the arbitration of a dispute between financial services
firms after it had procured substantially all the assets of one of the
disputing parties.82 Without explaining its decision, the arbitration
panel found O.R. Securities to be jointly and severally liable with the
losing disputant, despite O.R. Securities's motion to dismiss based on
the law of successor liability. 3 Later, on appeal before the Eleventh
Circuit, the court rejected O.R. Securities's argument that manifest
disregard of the law could be inferred from the panel's failure to address their legal arguments, explaining that the manifest disregard of
the law standard required "some showing in the record, other than the
result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it."' Such a showing will be particularly difficult where the
arbitrators do not write an opinion.
The court recognized this dilemma, stating that such a showing of
manifest disregard of the law would be "nearly impossible" to prove
where the arbitrators have opted not to state their reasons.15 Moreover, the court went on to explain that the lack of any requirement
that arbitrators explain their reasoning is "a strong argument in support of not recognizing manifest disregard of the law as a basis for
vacating an arbitration award."'
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit
has rejected manifest disregard of the law as a basis for review of arbitral awards.
Wilko v. Swan8 8 appears to require such an extreme showing on the
record. There the Court stated "[w]hile it may be true.., that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of
the Securities Act would 'constitute grounds for vacating the award

81. 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 744.
83. Id. at 747.

84. Id
85. Id. No such requirement exists. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 2, J
2627, Rule 627 (explaining required contents of award); N.A.S.D. Manual, supra note
2, 3741, § 41(e) (providing same requirements).
86. O.R. Securities, 857 F.2d at 747 & n.4.
87. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683-84 (11th Cir.) (rejecting the manifest

disregard of the law standard), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992); see also Brown v.
Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993) ("This Circuit,
however, has declined to adopt the manifest disregard of the law standard .
.
88. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,' that failure
would need to be made clearly to appear."89
2. Inferring Manifest Disregard from the Record
A slightly less strict showing on the record is demonstrated in Jenkins v. Prudential-BacheSecurities, Inc.90 There, the Tenth Circuit refused to overturn a panel's award where it was unable to state "with
positive assurance that the contract is not susceptible to a [contrary]
interpretation." 91 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit will vacate the
award only if the appellant can prove no possible justification. Thus,
the Tenth Circuit appears willing to infer any rationale that might justify the award whether or not addressed by the panel. In this situation, the arbitrators' silence insures against review unless the
appellant can show no possible justification for the award. 92 Such review is only slightly more lenient than a strict reading of the third
prong, where nothing may be inferred from the award, but rather the
arbitrators apparently must expressly state an intention to disregard
clearly controlling law.
Similarly, other circuits which recognize a more generalized nonstatutory basis for judicial review appear more willing to infer a disregard of the law, without the need for a direct showing. The Eleventh
Circuit's "arbitrary and capricious" standard, for example, allows review where no legal justification can be inferred from the award.93
Thus, even if the arbitrators do not expressly state the error on the
record, if the absence of legal justification may be inferred from the
case, the award may be vacated. This represents a less restrictive approach to the third prong.94

89. Id. at 436 (emphasis added) (quoting lower court opinion, 201 F.2d 439, 445
(2d Cir. 1953)); see also Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th
Cir.) (refusing to find manifest disregard where it does not directly appear on the
record or in the award), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
90. 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
91. Id. at 635. Note that in Jenkins the panel was faced with the interpretation of a
contract, id., which may be distinguishable from application of statutory law. See infra
notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
92. See Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Norad Reinsurance, 868 F.2d 52, 56
(3d Cir. 1989) (explaining the completely irrational basis for vacating an arbitration
award).
93. See supra note 77 (explaining arbitrary and capricious).
94. The First Circuit seems to allow review where: "[T]he governing law may
have such widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a
court could assume the arbitrators knew the rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under
the rug." Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
This suggests that if the reviewing judge could not have justified an award, the arbitral
award may be vacated based only upon a consideration of the award itself.
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D. Summary of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard
In sum then, arbitrators manifestly disregard the law when the
award is contrary to the obviously applicable and clearly governing
law. Moreover, arbitrators must be subjectively aware of such law and
decide to ignore it nonetheless. Finally, manifest disregard must be
expressly clear from the record. Thus, a genuine mistake by nonlawyer arbitrators, although plainly clear to the reviewing judge, may not
be overturned. Further, because arbitrators are not required to explain the award, the arbitrators can circumvent the law completely by
granting a lump sum award which is nearly impossible to review.
This attempt to define the manifest disregard of the law standard
demonstrates that, even if Congress added this as a basis for vacatur
under the FAA, the standard is too limited to be meaningful. Furthermore, such appeals result in undue expense and delay in the arbitration process. 95 Thus, despite the temptation to believe that
substantive review of arbitration awards, restricted to the limited circumstances of manifest disregard of the law, will help protect the parties from abuse and gross mistake without the substantial side effects
of undue expense and delay, a closer look at such review in practice
reveals its ineffectiveness in both respects. The continued existence of
this ground for review allows parties to plead ordinary legal error,
thereby causing undue
expense and delay, without the probability of
96
meaningful review.
Some commentators believe that arbitrators should be free from the
constraints of the law and should be able to decide cases based on
pure equity. 97 Moreover, even if a limited substantive review is necessary, it should be one which is uniformly dictated by federal law. To
further these ends, the standard must either be eliminated or redesigned and incorporated into the FAA. Before such a step is taken,
95. See Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (stating that in the "balance between the interest in rooting out possible
error and the interest in assuring that judgment be swift and economical... the latter
must generally prevail"), cerL denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990).
96. In Jenkins v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 636 (10th Cir. 1988), for
example, despite dismissing the request to vacate the award, the court refused to
grant Rule 11 sanctions because the basis for review was "colorable." Thus, it is hard
to find any incentive not to raise such an appeal. Moreover, in FSC Sec. v. Freel, 811
F. Supp. 439,446 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994), the court found
that no award of attorneys' fees was warranted where the challenge to the award was
not frivolous, but based on existing law. Given the state of this area of the law, it is
unlikely that any challenge would meet such a burden. Cf.Quick & Reilly, Inc. v.
Jacobson, 126 F.R.D. 24, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (awarding sanctions for a frivolous
appeal).
97. See e.g., Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of CommercialArbitrationAwards
in FederalCourt: Contemplatingthe Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard"of the
Law Standard,27 Ind. L. Rev. 241, 263-64 (1993) (discussing the notion that arbitratom may not be bound by the law); see also supra note 4 (citing examples of the
confusion over the manifest disregard standard).
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however, it is useful to examine the confusion among the circuits over
the justification for the various standards of substantive review.
II.

CONFUSION AMONG THE CIRCUITS

Despite the noted absence of any reference to manifest disregard of
the law as an enumerated basis for vacating an arbitration award
under § 10 of the FAA, it has nonetheless been endorsed by a number
of federal courts. What began as an offhand statement in Wilko v.
Swan 98 has become a widely cited justification for expansion of § 10.
To say, however, that such a standard is not based on the statute is an
oversimplification because even among those circuits that recognize
such judicially-created standards of review,99 disagreement persists
over the justification for such review.
A general survey of the courts of appeals reveals three prevailing
approaches to the FAA. Some circuits, including the Fifth, 10 0 Seventh,' 0 ' and Eighth, 0 2 refuse to recognize any grounds for vacating an
award not specifically listed in § 10. A second approach accepted by
05 Sixth, 10 6
14
some circuits, including the First, 0 3 Second, ' Fourth,
98. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (stating that "[t]he interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts,
to judicial review for error in interpretation").
99. See supra note 19.
100. See Mcllroy v. Painewebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e
disregard [appellant's] argument to the extent that they rely upon standards of review
outside the scope of the Arbitration Act."); R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d
534, 539 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]his circuit never has employed a 'manifest disregard of
the law' standard in reviewing arbitration awards."). But see Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (accepting the "draw its essence from the contract" standard), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206
(1991).
101. See Chameleon Dental Products v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1991)
("[T]he exclusive grounds for vacating or modifying a commercial arbitration award
are found in §§ 10 and 11 of the Arbitration Act."); Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook
& Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Sections 10 and 11 of the
Act set forth the exclusive grounds for vacating or modifying a commercial arbitration
award."). But see Health Servs. Mgmt. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992)
(stating that Seventh Circuit has applied manifest disregard of the law).
102. See Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(declining to apply manifest disregard of the law standard); FSC Sec. v. Freel, 811 F.
Supp. 439, 445 (D. Minn. 1993) ("The Eighth Circuit, however, has on two occasions
explicitly refused to adopt the manifest disregard standard."), aff'd, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th
Cir. 1994). But see Osceola County Rural Water Sys. v. Subsurfco, 914 F.2d 1072, 1075
(8th Cir. 1990) (accepting "draws essence from the contract" standard).
103. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Courts do, however, retain a very limited power to review arbitration awards outside of section 10.").
104. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 93334 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying manifest disregard of the law).
105. See Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1994) (accepting manifest disregard of the law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995). But see
Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that
"contract misconstruction is an insufficient basis for vacating an arbitration award"
under the FAA).
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and D.C. Circuits, 10 9 does not rely on any statu-

tory justification, but is content with a judicially-created standard. A
third group of those who accept such extra-statutory standards, including the Third" 0 and Tenth"' Circuits, seeks to justify such review
as an interpretation of § 10(a)(4),
which allows relief where arbitra2
tors "exceeded their powers.""1
A. Section 10 As the Exclusive Grounds for Review of the Law
The first group, perhaps the most straightforward, stalwartly rejects
any basis for review that is not found in § 10 of the FAA. The Fifth
Circuit provides the clearest example of this approach. In R.M. Perez
& Associates v. Welch," 3 the Fifth Circuit explained, "this circuit

never has employed a 'manifest disregard of the law' standard in reviewing arbitration awards.""' 4 The court went on to hold that "judicial review of a commercial arbitration award is limited to Sections 10
and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act."'1 5 In a subsequent case, the
106. See NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co., 43 F.3d 1076, 1079 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A] court may
vacate an award if the conduct of the arbitrator constitutes " 'manifest disregard' " of
applicable law."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
107. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.
1991) (appearing to accept manifest disregard of the law standard as a judicially-created standard); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902,
906 (9th Cir. 1986) (accepting the completely irrational or manifest disregard of the
law standard); see also Michigan MuL Ins. v. Unigard Sec. Ins., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th
Cir. 1995) (relying on Bobker, Advest, and Green Giant cases for manifest disregard
standard).
108. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683-84 (11th Cir.) (rejecting manifest disregard of the law standard, but recognizing arbitrary and capricious standard as judidaly-created basis for review), cerL denied, 113 S.Ct. 201 (1992).
109. See Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (appearing to accept manifest disregard standard); Sargent v. Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (appearing to allow review
for manifest disregard of the law, based, inter alia, on Second Circuit precedent), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990).
110. See Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Norad Reinsurance, 868 F.2d 52, 56
(3d Cir. 1989) (accepting completely irrational standard based on § 10(a)(4)); Swift
Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125,1130 & n.ll (3d Cir. 1972) (recognizing "draw
essence from the contract" standard based on § 10(a)(4) and labor cases).
111. See Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633-34 (10th Cir.
1988) (allowing review "either as an inherent appurtenance to the right of judicial
review or as a broad interpretation of subsection [10(a)(4)] prohibiting arbitrators
from exceeding their powers ...."); see also Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577,578-

79 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (premising review on § 10(a)(4)), aff'd, 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.
1995).
112. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994).
113. 960 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1992).
114. Id. at 539 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 539-40; see also Mdllroy v. Painewebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 & n.2
(5th Cir. 1993) ("During the pendency of the appeal, we declined to adopt 'manifest
disregard,' or any other standard, as an addendum to section 10.").
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Fifth Circuit refused to consider arguments for review which were not
based on a ground enumerated in § 10.116
Other circuits have adopted similar approaches. The Seventh Circuit, in Chameleon Dental Products v. Jackson, 1 7 has stated: "We
have not adopted exceptions to the exclusivity of §§ 10 and 11 [of the
FAA] and see no reason to do so in this case.""18 The Eighth Circuit,
without explaining its rationale, has consistently refused to accept the
manifest disregard of the law standard." 9
Such a stance is consistent with a plain reading of the statute, which
enumerates a finite list of grounds for vacating an award. Section
10(a) states: "In any of the following cases the [district court] may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration .... ,,120 Notably absent from that list is any mention of manifest disregard of the law, or, for that matter, any substantive review.'12 According to the common law maxim of contract and
z such a
statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"list should be read as exclusive. Moreover, the plain meaning rule of
statutory interpretation suggests that because the language, when
given its ordinary meaning, suggests a clear and unambiguous result,
that result should be applied without the need to look beyond the
text. 123 Thus, such a reading of § 10 indicates that the statute plainly
limits the court's ability to review arbitral awards.
116. Mcllroy, 989 F.2d at 820.
117. 925 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1991).
118. Id. at 226; see also Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849
F.2d 264, 272 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Judicial review has been thus restricted in order to...
resolve disputes promptly and inexpensively, without resort to litigation and often
without any requirement that the arbitrators state the rationale behind their decision.... ." (quoting Office of Supply v. New York Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379
(2d Cir. 1972) (footnotes and citations omitted))). But see Health Servs. Mgmt. v.
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]o vacate an arbitration award for
manifest disregard of the law, there must be something beyond and different from
mere error in law.. . ." (citing Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104

(D.C. Ill.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1980))).
119. See Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
("This circuit has never adopted manifest disregard as a basis for vacating an arbitrator's award.... ."); see also FSC Sec. v. Freel, 811 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D. Minn. 1993)
(explaining the Eighth Circuit's continued refusal to adopt the manifest disregard of
the law standard), aff'd, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994).
120. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994). The provision goes on to list four grounds for review.
Id. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
121. See supra note 13 (quoting § 10(a)(1)-(4)).
122. Meaning "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.11, at 496 (2d ed. 1990).
123. See Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899).
The general rule is perfectly well settled that, where a statute is of doubtful
meaning and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may
look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induce the act
in question, the mischiefs intended to be remedied, the extraneous circumstances, and the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its
proper construction. But where the act is clear upon its face, and when
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Even if the language of § 10 is seen as ambiguous, the existence of a
finite list is consistent with the purpose of the FAA. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the purpose "was to assure those who desired arbitration... that their expectations would not be undermined
by federal judges."'" Moreover, the congressional committee reports
give no allowance for review of the merits of an award.
The legislative history of the FAA makes it clear that a general review of the merits of arbitral awards is outside the role of the federal
judiciary. In fact, the House report describing the Act states that the
award "may... be entered as a judgment, subject to attack by the
other party for fraud and corruption and similar undue influence, or
for palpable error in form."' This limitation of review to procedural
fairness is supported by the explanation that mistakes must be "evident" and "not affecting the merits."'1 26 Thus, Congress apparently
envisioned no substantive review for commercial arbitration awards.
Similarly, the Senate report explains that the legislation was necessary to overturn the common law "jealousy" of courts over their jurisdiction.'2 7 In enacting the FAA, "Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." 12 Thus, the desire of courts to
exercise jurisdiction beyond the limited scope granted by Congress appears reminiscent of this common law "jealousy" and represents an
attempt to undermine the FAA.
Both the House and Senate reports unequivocally indicate congressional confidence in the ability of arbitrators to give parties' disputes
"full or proper redress."12 9 The scope of this redress does not appear
to be limited to specific types of disputes, such as those over contracts,
but rather appears to be modeled after various trade associations' arbitral bodies.' 30 Nonetheless, the prevalence and enforceability of
standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to it.
Id. (citations omitted). While modem courts are less apt to blindly apply the plain
meaning rule, its application in this situation may be worth noting, because nothing in
the statute suggests a manifest disregard of the law basis for review.
124. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting v. Terminal Costr., 287 F.2d 382,387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, Ci., concurring)).
125. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
126. 1&
127. S. Rep. No. 569, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924); see also Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924) (explaining that at common law courts
refused to give specific performance to arbitration clauses).
128. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10.
129. See S. Rep. No. 569, supra note 127, at 2.

130. See id. at 3 (stating that "'arrangements for... referring a dispute to friends

or neutral persons are a natural practice of which traces may be found in any state of
society'" (citation omitted)). For example, the Senate report referred particularly to
the Arbitration Society of America. Id. Moreover, the bill which became the FAA
had strong support from commercial interests. -LR. Rep. No. 96, supra note 125, at 2.
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predispute arbitration agreements and the expansion of federal regulatory legislation may prompt Congress to limit arbitration, absent
substantive review, either by subject area or dollar amount.' 3 ' No
such limitation, however, is evident in the FAA. Thus, it appears that
Congress envisioned arbitration, absent procedural unfairness, to be a
final resolution of parties' disputes.
B.

Judicially-CreatedReview of the Law

Despite Congress' intent to prohibit substantive review of arbitral
awards, some courts justify such review based on grounds that are not
expressly enumerated in § 10. Two separate lines of Supreme Court
precedent are cited to justify their existence.
1. The Wilko v. Swan

32

Precedent

The first approach is that taken by the Second Circuit. In Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,133 the Second Circuit
stated unequivocally, "'[m]anifest disregard of the law' . . . is a judi-

cially-created ground for vacating [an] arbitration award."'"

Accord-

ing to this approach, such review was created directly by the Supreme

Court in Wilko v. Swan and therefore needs no statutory justification

in the FAA. 3 5 In Kanuth v. Prescott,Ball & Turben, Inc., 3 6 the D.C.
Circuit stated directly that "[tihis formulation comes from dicta in
38
Wilko v. Swan.' 37 The First Circuit, in Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy,
3
the Fourth Circuit in Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc.,' the Sixth Circuit in NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co.,4 0 the Ninth Circuit in Todd Shipyards
131. See Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81,
84 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining that Congress has the power to exempt certain types of
contracts or regulatory schemes from the FAA), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
132. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
133. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
134. Id. at 933.
135. Id.
136. 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 1178 (citation omitted).
138. 914 F.2d 6, 9 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding the manifest disregard language
derived directly from Wilko). In Advest, the First Circuit reviewed the various standards of review accepted by the circuits and concluded that despite semantical differences they were fungible. See id at 9. As a result, the court divided arbitral review
into two categories. One category, involving labor disputes, is not reviewable unless
the "award is contrary to the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement."
Id.; see infra part II.B.2 (discussing interpretations of the contract). The second category, including the manifest disregard of the law standard, allows review "where it is
clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law-and then
ignored it." Advest, 914 F.2d at 9.
139. 32 F.3d 143, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1994), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).
140. 43 F.3d 1076, 1079 (6th Cir. 1995) (relying on judicial creation), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
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Corp. v. CunardLine, Ltd.,'141 and the Eleventh Circuit in Robbins v.
Day,142 appear to rely on this basis for their related standards. The
Tenth Circuit goes even further, stating "federal courts have never
43 limited their scope of review to a strict reading of this statute.'
Much has been made of the brief excerpt from Wilko, turning it
from an unexplained comment into a widely-cited authority with no
support in the statutory scheme. This is true despite the unquestionable fact that the comment is pure dictum.'" Moreover, the very issue
decided in Wilko, that predispute arbitration agreements are not enforceable for claims arising under the federal securities statutes, has
been definitively overruled.141 In addition, the Court followed the
commonly quoted excerpt from Wilko with an effort to explain that
the FAA, unlike English law, does not provide for judicial determination of legal issues in arbitration."4 In the absence of such a provision
the Court concluded that the FAA was insufficient to safeguard the
federal protection afforded to the market by the securities laws. 14 7
Supreme Court precedent is used to justify not only the manifest
disregard of the law standard, but also as a basis for similar and related standards.'4 In addition, an entirely different line of precedent
governing the review of an arbitrators' interpretations of the contract
has emerged in labor arbitration.
2. The Enterprise Wheel Precedent 4 9
A related line of Supreme Court precedent used as authority for
nonstatutory review emerged in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
141. 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing San Martine Compania De Navegadon v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1961) (interpreting
Wilko)).
142. 954 F.2d 679, 683 (lth Cir.) (finding arbitrary and capricious standard exists
outside the FAA and is created by courts), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 201 (1992).
143. Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
144. See e.g., Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) ("[A]n award may be vacated if the arbitrators made the award in 'manifest
disregard of the law.' This formulation comes from dicta in Wilko v. Swan.. . ." (em-

phasis added) (citation omitted)).
145. See supra note 2.
146. The passage states:
In unrestricted submissions, such as the present margin agreements envisage,
the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disre-

gard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in

interpretation. The United States Arbitration Act contains no provision for
judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in the English law.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
147. ld.
148. See, e.g., Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683-84 (11th Cir.) (defining the arbitrary and capricious standard with same justification), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 201

(1992).

149. The Enterprise Wheel line of cases is often recognized as an interpretation of
§ 10(a)(4), which governs arbitrators' exceeding their powers. For this reason, the
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Wheel & Car Corp. 5 ' In Enterprise Wheel, a labor case, the Supreme
Court stated:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
This deference to the arbitrators' interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement reflects a fundamental hallmark of arbitration-by
including an arbitration clause, the parties have agreed to be bound by
the arbitrators' view of their agreement. Enterprise Wheel recognizes
that in labor arbitration, the only boundary to the arbitrators' determination is that it must be anchored in the agreement itself. 152 In the
context of labor arbitration, this collective bargaining agreement defines the very relationship between the parties and thus it essentially
becomes the law of the dispute.' 53 So long as the award is based on
some interpretation of that agreement,
54 even if a judge might disagree,
the arbitrators' award must stand.'
Although it is especially significant in labor arbitration, the collective bargaining agreement is essentially an all-encompassing contract
between the parties. 55 Labor cases are not, therefore, unlike many
contractual disputes decided by arbitration. A further similarity is
that in such contract disputes, the arbitrators' interpretation of the
contract is bargained for by the parties and ultimately definitive of the
issues. Thus, many courts have expanded the "draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement" standard outside
the labor con56
text to apply in to all types of contract disputes.'
In Swift Industries v. Botany Industries, 57 the Third Circuit applied
this portion of Enterprise Wheel to commercial arbitration cases, and
Enterprise Wheel line may often overlap with the analysis under part II.C.
Nonetheless, it forms a judicially-created basis for review which is distinct from the
manifest disregard of the law standard. In fact, properly applied, it cannot review the
applicable law, but rather is limited to interpretations of contracts. See infra notes
167-76 and accompanying text (distinguishing review of the contract from the law).
150. 363 U.S. 593 (1960); see also United Paper Workers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29 (1987) (developing further the Enterprise Wheel analysis).
151. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 597; see Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 (explaining that the only limit on the
arbitrator is that he may not ignore the plain meaning of the collective bargaining
agreement).
153. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 (finding that arbitration is an important part of the
collective bargaining process whereby labor parties' relationships are defined).
154. Id.; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
155. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-37 (finding labor arbitrators' role as essentially one
of contract interpretation) (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597).
156. See, e.g., Osceola County Rural Water Sys. v. Subsurfco, 914 F.2d 1072, 1075
(8th Cir. 1990) ("[A] court may set aside an award if it fails to draw its essence from
the contract." (citations omitted)).
157. 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972).
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articulated a related standard of review, which it termed the "completely irrational" standard. 5 ' Although the Third Circuit's articulation of the completely irrational standard has not been widely
adopted, 15 9 other circuits have similarly relied on this same line of labor arbitration cases when dealing with disputes over interpretation of
the contract. Cases which rely on the Enterprise Wheel standard are
quite common in the commercial arbitration context."W The Eighth
Circuit, for example, while rejecting the manifest disregard of the law
standard,16' has noted its acceptance of this "draws its essence from
the contract" standard as an independent basis of review. 62 The
Tenth Circuit also appears to accept this standard. 63
The Enterprise Wheel line of cases, however, differs from commercial arbitration cases. Labor cases are controlled not by the FAA, but
by the Taft-Hartley Act'6 and, more broadly, by a national labor policy under which arbitration plays a very important role. These policies
1
behind labor cases are quite different from commercial arbitration, 61
and therefore support different justifications for review. 66 Thus, reliance on labor cases in this context is not entirely adequate.
158. Id. at 1130-31 (citation omitted).
159. Cf. French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906
(9th Cir. 1986) (accepting completely irrational standard as well as manifest disregard
of the law standard).
160. See e.g., Osceola County Rural Water Sys., 914 F.2d at 1075 (accepting "draws
its essence from the contract" standard); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847
F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating the Tenth Circuit's acceptance for this
standard).
161. Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
("This circuit has never adopted manifest disregard as a basis for vacating an arbitrator's award....").
162. Osceola County Rural Water Sys., 914 F.2d at 1075.
163. See Jenkins, 847 F.2d at 634 ("We have previously adopted the Enterprise
Wheel analysis."); see also Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577, 578-79 (N.D. Okla.
1993) (relying on "draws its essence from the contract" as the standard of review),
aff'd, 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995); infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing Tenth Circuit's approach).
164. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1988).
165. 4 Macneil, supra note 1, § 40.5.2.6 (noting the differences between FAA arbitration and labor arbitration); see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (explaining policy differences between commercial and
labor arbitration); see also American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal
Serv., 52 F.3d 359, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (addressing the inapplicability of FAA to
employment/labor cases under 9 U.S.C. § 1 and § 301 of Taft-Hartley Act).
166. In Macneil, the commentators question the use of labor cases as precedent in
commercial arbitration due to the alleged inability of labor arbitrators to look beyond
the particular collective bargaining agreement and consider the general tenets of labor law. Thus, "the principles against arbitrator application of law... are peculiar to
collective bargaining arbitration and have no proper place in FAA arbitration." 4
Macneil, supra note 1, § 40.5.2.6, at 40:55; see Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of Labor
ArbitrationAwards Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 32 V'll. L. Rev. 57,60-66 (1987)
(discussing disagreement among federal courts over the propriety of applying labor
case as precedent in commercial arbitration cases).
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Moreover, while labor cases generally focus on the contract because
the collective bargaining agreement is the heart of the dispute, the
underlying contract itself is less likely to be the ultimate issue in most
securities arbitration cases. This distinction is a meaningful one, because in any case in which the dispute centers on the contract, whether
a labor case or otherwise, the ultimate issue for determination is the
parties' agreement. When the dispute centers on the application of
some public law framework, such as the federal securities statutes, the
parties' agreement is irrelevant to whether the activity is a statutory
violation. Thus, the Enterprise Wheel line of cases is irrelevant when
the dispute is over a statute.
For example, in Jenkins v. Prudential-BacheSecurities, Inc.,167 the
dispute centered on whether Jenkins' employment contract envisioned
the closing of his particular branch office in Provo, Utah. 68 The issue
thus became whether or not the parties intended the employment
agreement to be limited to employment at the Provo office and no
other. This is distinguishable from a question of statutory law, where
the parties' agreement is not determinative. For example, whether a
given action constitutes churning 169 under the Securities Exchange
Act does not hinge on the parties' contract but applies uniformly to all
brokers. 70 In the former situation, to ask if the award "draws its essence from the contract" may be appropriate, while in the latter, such
a query makes little sense.
In Jenkins, the court explained:
While the 'manifest disregard' analysis deals mainly with willful
unattentiveness to the governing law, several other terms of art
have been employed to ensure that the arbitrator's decision relies
on his interpretation of the contract as contrasted with his own beliefs of fairness and justice....
We have previously adopted the Enterprise Wheel analysis
[where] . . . "the role of the courts in reviewing arbitral awards is
limited to the determination of whether the arbitrator's award
'draws its essence from the contract of the parties.'" . . . "'[This
standard protects] not only asserted errors in determining the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony,. . . and
[the] application of the collective bargaining agreement.' As the
Supreme Court has stated, 'it is the arbitrator's construction which
is bargained for, and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns con167. 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).

168.

AL at 633.

169. Churning occurs when a broker, in an effort to increase commissions, initiates
transactions on a customer's account which are excessive, given the character of the
account and the customer's objectives. See Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577, 578
n.1 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 220 (5th ed. 1979)).
170. That is not to say that there are no factual distinctions to be made in each case,
or even that the parties' understanding as to access to the account is irrelevant.
Rather, the distinguishing idea is that churning is not defined by contract, but subjects
all people to the same legal standard.
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struction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him
because their interpretation of the contract is different from
his.' "171

The arbitrator's construction of the law, on the other hand, is arguably
open to less deference, because the parties have not agreed to be
bound by the arbitrator's interpretation of the securities laws. Rather,
the parties as well as the rest of the industry are subject to the same
law. The law, unlike a contract, is not subject to an interpretation of
the subjective understanding of the parties. Thus, the "draws its essence from the contract" standard is inapplicable where the law,
rather than the contract itself, is at issue.
In Jenkins, the Tenth Circuit blurred this distinction by generalizing
a single legal standard of review, which it loosely termed "a sort of
'abuse of discretion' standard."'1 2 Unlike Jenkins, the First Circuit in
Adves4 Inc. v. McCarthy, 73 recognized this distinction and identified
two separate categories of review:
[T]his array of alternatively worded formulations consists of two
classes of cases where an arbitral award is subject to review. One
category, usually involving labor arbitration, is where an award is
contrary to the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement. The second category embraces instances where it is clear
from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable lawand then ignored it.174
Advests first category, dealing -with the proper construction of a contract, is subject to this "contrary to the plain language of the contract"
standard,17 5 and is distinct from the standard of review of the applicable law. The First Circuit's approach, distinguishing review in contract
interpretation cases from review of the law, appropriately preserves
the meaning of each standard. 76 Thus, the "draws its essence from
the contract" standard is distinguishable from the manifest disregard
of the law standard.

171. Jenkins, 847 F2d at 634-35 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 634.
173. 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).

174. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).

175. While the Frst Circuit fails to define this standard more fully, it appears to be
based on the Enterprise Wheel standard. See Strathmore Paper Co. v. United

Paperworkers Int'l Union, 900 F.2d 423,427 (1st Cir. 1990) (basing analysis on Enterprise Wheel considerations); Berklee College of Music v. Berklee Chapter of the Massachusetts Fed. of Teachers, 858 F.2d 31, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1988) (basing analysis on
Enterprise Wheel), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989).
176. Other circuits also appear to recognize this distinction. See e.g., Kanuth v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Kanuth, the court
analyzed separately a claim that arbitrators ignored the plain language of an employ-

ment contract, i at 1179-82, from a claim that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded
the law in calculating damages for breach of that contract. Id. at 1182.
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C. Review of the Law Based on § 10(a) (4): ArbitratorsExceeding
Their Powers
The last group of circuits justify the manifest disregard of the law
standard and related standards as interpretations of § 10(a)(4), which
provides for review where arbitrators "exceeded their powers." The
Tenth Circuit, for example, holds "a broad interpretation of subsection [10(a)(4)]' 177 as one premise for substantive judicial review.' 78
In Kelley v. Michaels,1 79 the district court explained that it had
power under FAA § 10(a)(4) to review arbitration awards "'[w]here
the arbitrators exceeded their powers.' "180 The court went on to explain that the Tenth Circuit interpreted the scope of such review to be
limited to a determination of whether the award " 'draws its essence
from the contract.' "181 As stated above, such a scheme adopts the
arbitrators' view of the facts and of the contract unless that view is so
contrary to the clear meaning of the contract that no reasonable minds
could differ.' 82 In such a case, the award may be reviewed for abuse
of discretion.' 83
The Third Circuit recognizes a similar link between its completely
irrational standard and § 10(a)(4) of the FAA. 84 In reviewing an arbitration award, the Third Circuit determines whether the award 8is
5
consistent with § 10(a)(4) by applying the completely irrational test.1
Using a two-part test, the court scrutinizes whether both the form of
the award and its terms are rationally inferable. 86 First, the court
must determine if the form of the award is rationally based on the
submission."8 Second, the court must determine if the actual result is
177. Jenkins, 847 F.2d at 633.
178. See, e.g., Kelley v. Michaels, 830 F. Supp. 577, 578-79 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (relying on § 10(a)(4)), aff'd, 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 578 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988)).
181. Id. (citing Jenkins, 847 F.2d at 635); see supra part II.B.2 (discussing the "draws
its essence from the contract" standard).
182. Kelley, 830 F. Supp. at 578-79.
183. Id. at 579.
184. See Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. v. Norad Reinsurance, 868 F.2d 52, 56
(3d Cir. 1989) (relying on § 10 to determine the extent of the court's discretion in
vacating an arbitrators' judgment); Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1130
n.11 (3d Cir. 1972) ("These principles [of reviewing arbitral awards] are consistent
with the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. s 10[(a)(4)] .... ).
185. Mutual Fire,868 F.2d at 56 (determining "whether appellants were entitled to
vacate the arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10[(a)(4)]" (citations omitted)).
186. Id. ("In conducting our review we must examine both the form of the relief
awarded ... as well as the terms of that relief."); see also Northeast Fin. Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 757 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D. Del. 1991) (adopting a "two-part
inquiry").
187. See, e.g., Mutual Fire,868 F.2d at 56 (finding that the arbitration panel's determination of coverage was not completely irrational); NortheastFinancial,757 F. Supp.
at 386 (finding that the arbitration panel's consideration of insurance provisions was
rational).
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completely irrational." While this approach differs in form from the
manifest disregard of the law standard,s 9 it nonetheless attempts to
define the scope of review set forth in § 10(a)(4).191
Unlike some circuits that blatantly create a new standard, these circuits attempt to link the expanded review to the statute. 91 The link,
however, is tenuous at best. Section 10(a)(4) allows review "[w]here
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made."' 192 Read as a whole, the statute appears to
create both an outer boundary for arbitrators' authority, as well as a
minimal standard for arbitrators' awards. The outer limits of the arbitrators' power suggests that the award may not go beyond what the
parties submitted, nor what the courts will enforce. 193 The minimum
standard of mutuality, finality, and definiteness suggests that the arbitrators must address all of the issues submitted to them, and give a
complete award. This limitation focuses "upon the subject matter submitted,"'194 not upon the law applied.
The first limit on the arbitrators' power was addressed by the D.C.
195
Circuit Court of Appeals in Kanuth v. Prescott,Ball & Turben, Inc.
There, the court pointed to the limits of the parties' submission, stating: "[T]he arbitrators did not have the authority under the contract
itself to construct the kind of remedy that they have proposed.",
The second limit on the arbitrators' power under § 10(a)(4) is the
limit of what the courts will enforce. One possible example of such a
limitation might have been raised had the Supreme Court denied arbitrators the power to award punitive damages.'9 In that case, if the
arbitrators' award included punitive damages, that portion of the
188. Mutual Fire,868 F.2d at 56; Northeast Financial,757 F. Supp. at 385.
189. The Third Circuit, in labor cases, refers to a "manifest disregard of the agreement" standard as equivalent to the "draws its essence from the contract" standard.
See News An. Publications v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21,
24 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). This standard has not been applied to the manifest disregard of applicable law.
190. See Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1130 n.11 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding review consistent with § 10).
191. The D.C. Circuit, for example, links its expanded review to § 10(a)(4). See
Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
D.C. Circuit, however, posits no equivalent link to its manifest disregard of the law
standard. See id.at 1182.
192. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994).
193. See 4 Macneil, supra note 1, §§ 40.5.2.1-40.5.22 (finding that whether arbitrators have exceeded their powers depends on the parties' consent to the arbitrators'
decision and the courts' willingness to enforce it).
194. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
195. 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
196. Id. at 1180 (emphasis added); see also Michigan Mut. Ins. v. Unigard Sec. Ins.,
44 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that under § 10(a)(4) arbitrators exceed their
power when they rule on matters not submitted or matters outside the agreement).
197. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 1212 (1995).
This recent case purports to settle the long-standing dispute over the ability of arbitra-
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award might have been vacated under § 10(a)(4), because the arbitrators exceeded the limits of the courts' willingness to enforce the
award. 198 Thus, review under § 10(a)(4) is best viewed as focusing on
the limits of the arbitrators' authority, rather than on the substance of
the award.
The Fourth Circuit, in Miller v. PrudentialBache Securities, Inc.,"
rejected the argument that § 10(a)(4) provides a basis for substantive
review. In Miller, a customer alleged that the arbitration panel had
incorrectly used a New York statute of limitations to bar her claim.
The court refused to consider this as a basis for review since "federal
courts have consistently held that they will not 'set aside an arbitrator's award for mere errors of law.' "200 Thus, according to Miller,
§ 10(a)(4) does not allow substantive review.2 0 ' Therefore, despite
some courts' attempts to anchor substantive review of the law in the
plain language of § 10(a)(4), the statute does not support such review."~ In fact, that section is limited to the form of the award, rather
than its substance.
This overview of the approaches taken by the federal courts of appeals reveals the ineffectiveness of attempts to establish substantive
legal review of arbitration awards. The confusion of these high courts
evidences an ineffectiveness and lack of consensus. Moreover, an examination of the FAA confirms the lack of support for such review. 203
Although various approaches are taken, each fails to create an adequate basis for substantive legal review of arbitration awards.
III.

ARBITRATION MODELS

The courts' attempts to articulate a workable standard of judicial
review for legal error in arbitration reflect the fundamental conflict
between the speed, informality, and economic efficiency of arbitration
and the exhaustive legal precision of the litigation process. The
courts' inability to balance successfully these competing interests in
the manifest disregard of the law standard suggests the need to reexamine the arbitration process.
tors to issue punitive damages, concluding that they are allowable. But see Katsoris,
supra note 2, at 144 (arguing that Mastrobuono's effects are open to question).
198. See NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co., 43 F.3d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir.) (finding award of
punitive damages to nonparty "exceeded [the arbitrators'] powers"), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 272 (1995).
199. 884 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990).

200. Id. at 130 (quoting Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d
894, 896 (4th Cir. 1961)).
201. See id; accord Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1180
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (limiting review to the "kind" of the award).
202. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional
reports).
203. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text (discussing FAA text and
reports).
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In order to develop a uniform model of arbitration in which these
goals are balanced, analogies can be drawn from other accepted mechanisms for settling disputes. One such mechanism is the consent decree, whereby the parties' privately reached settlement is given
binding effect when entered by the court as a judgment. This approach leaves little room for judicial review. An alternative mechanism is the litigation process, whereby the trial court's judgment is
subjected to the review of the appellate process. Both alternatives
suggest not only a standard for judicial review, but also an extensive
revision of the arbitral scheme.
A. The Consent Decree Model
The first alternative is based on the consent decree model of arbitration. Under this approach, the parties' predispute arbitration
agreement is presumed to be an election to settle disputes fully and
finally through private means. This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's Burchell v. Marsh"° conception of arbitration as the selection
of a forum where "[a]rbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to
decide the matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal." 05s
In essence, the parties agree to bring their disagreements to the private arbitrators, who, in a procedurally fair forum, reach a decision for
the parties. By selecting arbitration, the parties adopt the arbitrators'
decision, so long as it is fairly reached. 2 06
The only judicial role required under this scheme is that role played
by courts entering a consent decree, where the private settlement is
not scrutinized in the same way as a judgement on the merits? 7
Rather, the court must accept the settlement unless there is evidence
of procedural unfairness, unreasonableness, or inadequacy. 2 s The
only grounds on which to vacate a consent decree are fraud, lack of
consent, or lack of jurisdiction. 2 9 Thus, as with a consent decree,
courts will not scrutinize the merits of the private arbitral settlement.
204. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).

205. Id. at 349.
206. This, of course, presumes that arbitration is a voluntary, consensual process,
selected by the parties. Cf. supra note 2 (discussing contracts of adhesion).
207. United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th
Cir. 1992).
208. Id.; Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1990).
209. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928). In that case, the
Supreme Court explainedDecrees entered by consent have been reviewed upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim of lack of actual consent to the decree as entered; or of fraud in its procurement; or that there was lack of federal
jurisdiction because of the citizenship of the parties. But "a decree, which
appears by the record to have been rendered by consent, is always affirmed,
without considering the merits of the cause."

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. United

States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885)); see also Owen M. Fss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U.
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Lack of judicial review does not exempt the arbitrators from applying the law. Rather, they will be called upon to apply the law
presented by the parties.21 0 The courts, however, may not review the
law applied, but rather entrust that to the safeguards of the adversarial forum.21 ' In this way, the arbitrators' determination is final.
Such a model is consistent with the current federal scheme,21 2 as
well as parties' expectations of arbitration. As under the current process, this approach would require no formal opinion, only an award.21 3
Thus, both time and money are preserved, since the arbitrators need
only present the result without explaining their reasoning or findings.
This allows arbitrators to handle more cases, while limiting the expense of an arbitrator's time spent on each case.
Similarly, this approach is consistent with the informal arbitration
atmosphere in which the formal rules of evidence and discovery are
not strictly enforceable.2 14 Rather, the arbitrator is left to decide what
is relevant in each case. 15 This is also consistent with arbitration's
Chi. Legal F. 1, 12-16 (explaining the limitations of a judge's ability to review a consent decree).
Obviously, distinctions exist between the consent decree and an agreement to arbitrate. Most obvious, perhaps, is the reality that in a consent decree the consent follows the settlement agreement. This does not always result from the ideal of consent,
however, because consent decrees are often reached in order to avoid less pleasant
consequences. Moreover, with an election to arbitrate, the consent is an election of
the mechanism rather than the result. In this way, many of the consent decree's procedural safeguards are provided by the arbitration mechanism.
210. The election to arbitrate must be the equivalent of consent to have legal disputes decided by the arbitrators, rather than the courts. Still, this may not be appropriate in all cases. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
211. In an adversarial forum, the parties' opposition counterbalance each other and
best equip the arbitrator with the information needed to reach the proper result. See
Stephan Landsman, The Adversary System: A Description and Defense 2 (1984) (defining the adversarial system). According to Landsman, the elements of the adversarial system are: (1) a neutral and passive decision maker; (2) party presentation of
evidence and argument in a competitive format; and (3) structured procedures. Id. at
2-6. Thus, these elements are largely present in the consent model.
212. See Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81,
84 (D.C. Cir.) (finding that "[t]he strong federal policy in favor of voluntary commercial arbitration would be undermined if the courts had the final say on the merits of
the award"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
213. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
214. Currently formal rules of evidence do not apply and discretion is left to the
arbitrators. N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 2, 2620, Rule 620; N.A.S.D. Manual, supra
note 2, 3734, § 34; see also Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement
Disputes: Encouraging The Use of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 247, 269-70 (1995) (addressing lack of formal rules of evidence in
patent arbitration).
Also, the rules create a general outline of discovery and call for members to "cooperate fully." N.Y.S.E. Manual, supra note 2, 2619, Rule 619; N.A.S.D. Manual,
supra note 2, 3732, § 32; see also N.Y.S.E. Symposium, supra note 2, at 1551-69
(discussing issues of discovery).
215. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, The Arbitrator's Manual 23-24
(1992) (explaining arbitrators' job is to decide evidentiary issues based on fairness to
the parties); id. at 9-14 (suggesting discovery guidelines for arbitrators).
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lack of case law development, since the only concern is with the current parties' case.
Most importantly, the consent decree model eliminates the necessity of substantive appeals. Rather, the parties have to show concrete
procedural unfairness to proceed with an appeal or argue against entering the award.216 Such a concrete standard is easily applied and
leads to finality. Moreover, it enhances the speed, informality, and
limited expense of arbitration for the parties and also serves to reduce
the case loads of courts.
The consent decree model clearly distinguishes arbitration from litigation. Moreover, it highlights the distinctions the parties must consider prior to a dispute.2 17 Because such a system favors efficiency
over precision in complex legal matters, it may be unsuitable for certain complex cases or incompatible with certain federal statutory
schemes 218 Just as current rules contain exceptions for class actions,2 19 this approach might allow an exemption or opt-out for complex legal issues, high dollar cases, or noncontractual disputes?220
On the other hand, it would provide a suitable and efficient forum
for more routine customer complaints. As such, the model would require Congress, rather than the self-regulatory organizations, to take
the lead in shaping arbitration, and especially in regulating the predispute arbitration agreement. Because this model represents a clearly
distinct alternative to litigation, the distinctions must be clear to the
parties at the time they enter the agreement2'- Such a distinction certainly adds to uniformity and predictability.
B.

The Litigation Model

The alternative model would make the federal arbitration scheme
something more akin to a private courtroom. As with the consent
216. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
217. This model adds clarity to the choice of arbitration, helping to reduce the contract of adhesion dilemma. See supra note 2 (discussing contract of adhesion issue).
Still, the model works best in a truly voluntary system.
218. For example, in employment discrimination cases or complex securities issues
the consent decree model may not be proper. See C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeak An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 Ky. LJ. 347, 356-60 (1990-91) (discussing
the need for greater judicial review in complex legal issues being arbitrated).
219. N.Y.S.E. Guide, supra note 2, 2600, Rule 600(d); N.A.S.D. Manual, supra
note 2, 3712, § 12(d).
220. See Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 FI.d 81,
84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980). In that case, the court discussed the
potential power of Congress to exempt certain kinds of contracts from application of
the FAA, even despite the parties' previous agreement to arbitrate. Id. In Revere, the
subject was insurance contracts, and the court declined to exempt such contracts from
the FAA. Id. In another context, it might be appropriate for Congress to recognize
such an exemption for complex or noncontractual types of disputes.
221. This model will operate best in a system which preserves its voluntariness. At
the very least, the distinctions should be clearly outlined in the predispute arbitration
agreement.
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decree model, Congress should take the lead in defining a uniform
arbitration process. Under this approach, however, the model would
define a clear judicial standard of review for legal errors in arbitration
awards that is more analogous to ordinary litigation. Before addressing the scope of such review, several other procedural changes would
be required to make this arbitral model complete.
First, the litigation model should mandate written findings of fact as
well as legal conclusions for each award. 22 This would increase legal
precision, make judicial review realistic, and eliminate arbitrators'
ability to disregard the law. Moreover, these written findings would
assist the development of case law. Such written findings might be
waived in simple or low dollar amount cases.
Second, procedural rules should be designated to create greater uniformity. Such rules could be simple and straightforward, but also deal
consistently with issues such as evidence 22 3 and discovery. 224 For example, such rules could create a uniform standard for document production,225 or supply guidelines for reliable evidence.226 Most
important, such rules would be articulated at the federal level, creating a single approach to the arbitral forum.
Third, in order to facilitate the implementation of these changes,
arbitrators should either be attorneys or, at the least, possess a minimum federally-mandated degree of training in the law relating to the
type of cases handled by the arbitrator.227 This would reduce the incidence of legal error. Moreover, specialization in a given area of arbitration claims would allow the development of expertise, leading to
accuracy, efficiency, and greater predictability.
Finally, a standard of substantive review must be articulated in § 10
to facilitate a uniform federal approach to judicial review. The standard must provide for meaningful review of legal error, more akin to
appellate review of litigation, rather than the arbitrary approaches
currently taken by the various circuits. It must provide for review of
all reversible legal error, whether deliberate or otherwise. Findings of
fact and interpretations of the contract, however, should be left to the
arbitrator without judicial intervention.
222. Hochman, supra note 40, at 269-74 (calling for written explanation of awards);
see Stewart, supra note 218, at 359-60 (calling for written opinions in complex cases);
cf. supra note 85 (explaining that no written explanation is required). Speed could be
facilitated by the development of an award form allowing simplified presentation in
simple cases.
223. See supra note 214.
224. See supra note 214.
225. See N.Y.S.E. Symposium, supra note 2, at 1553-56 (proposing changes in discovery rules).
226. See Paradise, supra note 214, at 271-73 (discussing the problem of lack of evidence standards in patent arbitration).
227. See supra note 40.
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Unlike the manifest disregard of the law standard, the uniform standard should apply to all serious errors of the law resulting in an erroneous award. Thus, the error need not be obvious or capable of
readily being perceived by the average arbitrator - The mere fact
that the arbitrators reached the wrong legal result is enough to trigger
judicial examination. After all, even if an error is not deliberate, its
effect is the same. 2 9
Lastly, the fact that the arbitrator must articulate the legal reasoning as well as make factual findings, allows for a finding of error on
the record. Under this scheme, if the arbitrators' application of the
critical law is incorrect, the award should be vacated just as in a trial
court.
At the same time, other aspects of the arbitrator's award should be
entitled to a greater degree of deference. Such deference is implicit in
the FAA and widely recognized by the courts. Such deference must
continue with regard to the arbitrators' factual findings and interpretations of the contract. 3 0 Thus, the same great deference is due to the
arbitrators' factual findings and interpretations of the contract, while
the applicable law is subject to virtually the same judicial scrutiny as
ordinary litigation.
This model considerably increases legal precision and encourages
uniformity and public confidence in arbitration. By creating meaningful substantive review, both by requiring a legal justification and by
articulating a workable standard of review, the litigation model assures parties a more precise legal outcome. This approach also creates
a valuable means for the development of case law in the areas which
may be stagnant under the existing system. Moreover, by minimizing
the difference between arbitration and litigation, much of the current
confusion about judicial review of arbitration awards is also
minimized. 23 1
Of course, these changes will sacrifice time, expense, and userfriendliness. More highly trained arbitrators will, no doubt, demand
higher fees. In addition, the added findings requirement will also increase the expenditure of time and money for each case. z 2 Moreover,
technical procedural rules add to the complexity of the proceedings
228. See suprapart L.A (discussing the view that error must be obvious and capable
of being recognized by an average qualified arbitrator).
229. See supra part LB (explaining circuit courts' rulings that innocent errors cannot be vacated by the reviewing court unless intentional).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 167-76 (illustrating that the interpretation
of the contract is distinct from application of the law).
231. Minimizing the differences makes the waiver of judicial litigation less significant. Moreover, this approach should comfort those who advocate that arbitration
should offer identical procedural safeguards as litigation. See supra note 2.
232. See Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) ("[A]bsence of a duty to explain is presumably one of the reasons why
arbitration should be faster and cheaper than an ordinary law suit."), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1028 (1990).
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and open the door for greater procedural error. These elements of
the litigation model sacrifice many of arbitration's greatest attributes.
Most significantly, the added degree of judicial review, while fostering greater legal precision, risks making arbitration an additional step
in the exhaustive litigation process. Rather than an opportunity to
settle disputes quickly and efficiently, arbitration will become an alternative fact-finding body with an additional level of appeal for questions of law. Such a model seems very different from the system
envisioned by the FAA.
IV.

THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONSENT DECREE MODEL

The consent decree model outlines an arbitration process where the
goals of speed, informality, and economic efficiency are not needlessly
sacrificed in the pursuit of exhaustive legal precision. While the current system aspires to these goals, 233 the consent decree model realizes them. This distinction is magnified when the consent decree
model is compared to the litigation model and its pursuit of legal precision. Therefore, the consent decree model offers the best solution to
the problem of judicial review of arbitration for legal error.
The balance reached by the consent decree model is the most consistent with the FAA. This is clear from the language of the statute,
which, when devising the limits of oversight by the courts, made no
mention of review for legal error.234 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, echoing the FAA mandate of a narrow judicial role, explained
that in the "balance between the interest in rooting out possible error
and the interest in assuring that judgment be swift and economical....
the latter must generally prevail. ' 235 Thus, the preference for speed
and efficiency is well founded.
The congressional reports confirm Congress' confidence in arbitrators' ability to provide legal precision,236 while depicting arbitration as
an " 'arrangement[ ] for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation.' ",237 Moreover, that arbitration was intended to favor informality and efficiency over legal precision is implicit in the Senate report's
references to arbitration's "practical justice" and "common sense" rulings, rooted in the natural practice of referring disputes to friends or
neutral third parties, as an alternative to the courts.23s These attitudes
are consistent with the balance reached by the consent decree model.
233. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (analyzing the plain language of
the FAA regarding substantive review of arbitration awards).
235. Sargent, 882 F.2d at 533.
236. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
237. S. Rep. No. 569, supra note 127, at 3.
238. Id.
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One final fact that is evident from the FAA is that arbitration is
intended to offer an alternative to the crowded court system?3 9 If
arbitration is to supply that alternative, it should remain distinct from
litigation. The consent decree model best preserves that distinction by
providing an approach to legal disputes that is faster, less formal, and
more economically efficient than the litigation model.
CONCLUSION

Securities arbitration balances the competing interests of speed, informality, and economic efficiency against legal precision. This balancing is demonstrated in the area of judicial review of arbitral awards
for legal error. Judicial review creates a fundamental conflict between
the parties' election of a nonjudicial settlement through arbitration
and traditional reliance on the courts to root out possible errors of
law.
The current solution, advocated by many courts, is the manifest disregard of the law standard. According to this narrow standard, judicial review for legal error is limited to the deliberate disregard of
clearly applicable law. The federal courts' widespread disagreement
and difficulty defining the applicability of such standards renders the
manifest disregard of the law standard inconsistent with the goals of
arbitration and ineffective at providing meaningful review. Therefore,
the manifest disregard standard should be rejected and the area of
judicial review reconsidered.
This Note has proposed two models for reconsidering the competing interests of judicial review in arbitration. The consent decree
model, drawing from analogy to the consent decree, aims to simplify
arbitration and entrust legal issues to the arbitrators chosen by the
parties. The litigation model, based on ordinary litigation, provides
meaningful appeals of legal issues to the courts, along with its accompanying delay and expense. This Note argues that the speed, informality, and economic efficiency afforded by the consent decree model
is most consistent with the FAA and congressional intent for arbitration. Moreover, because it provides a clear alternative to the slow and
costly court system, it offers the best solution to the conflict over judicial review of arbitral awards.

239. See id.

